"[M]ost humanists believe that there is no such thing as 'the' truth; rather, there are only multiple, historically contingent truths that operate in particular cultural contexts and shape the truth regimes that form there." (5)
"Most humanists believe, also, that whatever truth regime exists does so (at least partly) to consolidate the power and worldview of the social group, class, or institution that proposes it, and that it is just as likely that truth is a function of social power, and not the other way around" (5)
"Humanists of my generation learned this primarily from reading Foucault" (5)
However, "the humanist critique of truth seems to lead humanists themselves into a metadiscourse about their own practice that makes it harder for them to advocate for that practice. It makes it harder for humanists to describe what they do as a truth-generating activity whose research results ought to be taken into account by social actors" (8, see also 6)